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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED Oy APPEAL 
1. Was the Appellant injured ih the course of her 
employment or arising from her employmeint as a matter of 
law? 
2. Should the definition of "course of employment" 
which has arisen in workmen's compensation cases be applied 
in negligence cases to prevent an injured person from recov-
ering damages? 
3. Should the Appellant be barred from suing a co-
employee for negligence merely because the accident which 
gave rise to this litigation occurred on \\er employer's pre-
mises? 
-iii-
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal from an Order by the 
Honorable John Wahlquist of the Second Judicial District 
Court of Weber County. Specificallyf Judge Wahlquist 
granted summary judgment and dismissed Appellant's case 
which she brought against the respondent for injuries 
resulting from an automobile-pedestrian accident. Judge 
Wahlquist1s Order and the Findings of F^ct and Conclusions 
of Law are attached to this brief in the Addendum. 
STATEMENT, OF FACTS 
Appellant and Respondent are both federal employees 
who work at the Defense Depot Ogden. F.F|.
 f p_«2* On October 
17, 1984, the Appellant parked her automobile in the parking 
lot at the DDO where she worked. F.F. ,p«|2. She exited her 
vehicle and attempted to walk to the buillding in which she 
worked. F.F.,p.2 
The Respondent had arrived for work at approxi-
mately the same time F.F.,p^2. As he drovp through the park-
ing lot his vehicle struck the Appellant. F.F.,p.3. 
Appellant was injured as a result of the collision. F.F., p.3. 
At the time of the accident, neither the Appellant 
or Respondent had "punched in" or actually reported for 
work, F.F. ,p. 3, nor were they being paid for the time they 
spent in the parking lot. F.F.,p.3 
Appellant has received Federal Worker's 
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Compensation Benefits from the Federal Employees 
Compensation. Administration. F.F.,p.3 
The accident occurred on the employer's premises. 
For purposes of the Motion for Summary Judgment, whether or 
not there was negligence is immaterial. F.F.,p.2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Briefly, Appellant argues that it was error for the 
trial court to hold that "course of employment" as defined 
in workmen's compensation cases should be applied to negli-
gence cases. This is the case because "course of 
employment" has been broadly and/or liberally construed to 
help injured workers obtain compensation. Consequently, 
this language should not automatically be applied in other 
types of litigation (i.e., negligence cases) to prevent an 
injured party from recovering damages in a negligence case. 
Some other states define course of employment lib-
erally in workmen's compensation cases. However, they apply 
a less broad definition in negligence cases. This allows 
some negligence lawsuits to proceed. Appellant argues that 
this court: should also define "course of employment" differ-
ently in a negligence case. 
This will necessitate reversal of the trial court's 
ruling and order. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
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THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION DEFINITION OF 
"COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT" SHOULD NOT BE 
APPLIED TO NEGLIGENCE CASES 
Utah's Workmen's Compensation Statute (U.C.A. 
35-1-45) provides that employees who suffer an injury within 
the course of their employment or arising out of their 
employment can only claim worker's compensation benefits as 
their sole and exclusive remedy. A recertt Utah case inter-
preting this law has held that any injuty which occurs on 
the employer's premises to an employee i$ within the course 
of employment. Soldier Creek Coal y. Bfeiley, 22 U.A.R. 9 
(Utah, 1985). 
Respondent contended since this| accident occurred 
in a parking lot on the premises of the defense Depot Ogden 
that workmen's compensation was the Appellant's only remedy 
for her injuries. The trial court accepted this contention 
and granted the Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The basic question that this li|tigation raises is 
whether this Court should apply the standard of "Course of 
Employment" which has evolved in workmen's compensation 
cases to negligence cases. It is the Appellant's contention 
that it was error for the trial court to Automatically apply 
the same standard conclusion. The Court Stated: 
The clear intention of our legisla-
ture was to "substitute a more humanitar-
ian and economical system of compensation 
for injured workers or their dependents 
in case of their death" which the more 
humane and moral conception of our time 
requires. [36 P.2d at 981] 
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In North Beck Mj.ni.r12 Company y^ Industrial 
Commission, 200 P. Ill (Utah, 1921 ) the court stated the 
following: 
The Industrial Act, ... must be lib-
erally construed and with the purpose of 
effectuating its benficient and humane 
objects. [200 P. at 112] 
In Wilstead y^ Industrial Commission, 407 P.2d 692 
(Utah, 1965) the Utah Supreme Court stated that: 
The purposes which underlie the 
workmen's compensation act are: to assure 
to the injured employee and his depend-
ents an income during the period of his 
total disability and to provide compensa-
tion for any resulting permanent disabi-
lity; to accomplish this by a simple and 
speedy procedure which eliminates the 
expense delay and uncertainty in having 
to prove negligence on the part of the 
employer; and to thus require industry to 
bear the burden of the injuries suffered 
in it. [407 P.2d at 693] 
The prior cases show that the court has attempted 
to LIBERALLY CONSTRUE the workmen's compensation statute to 
provide coverage for an injured employee when possible. 
It logically follows that the "course of 
employment" has been defined as broadly as it has been to 
enable injured workers who would otherwise be unable to * 
claim workmen's compensation to do so. Further, it must be 
conceded that this term has indeed been broadly defined. If 
mere presence anywhere on an employer's premises constitutes 
being within course of employment, the phrase is an extre-
mely broad one indeed! 
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It is a mistaKe for a court tb take this broad 
phrase defined in workmen's compensation cases and to apply 
it automatically in other types of lawsuilts. In this case, 
rather than aiding an injured person in recovering damages 
it has had the opposite effect. Here, it has resulted in 
the dismissal of an injured person's suit for damages. 
Other courts in other states h$s considered this 
issue. *1 Two rules have developed. One rule automatically 
applies the "scope of employment" to standard as it devel-
oped in workmen's compensation cases to negligence cases.**2 
The other rule defines "scope of employment" differently in 
negligence cases than in workmen's compensation cases. 
Appellant contends that the rulfe which requires a 
different definition of "scope of employment" in negligence 
cases is the one which should be adopted by this court as 
Utah law. Such a rule may not be simple, but justice and 
simplicity do not always run together. 
In McNaughton v^ Si-ms^  147 SE2d 631 (South 
Carolina, 1966) the South Carolina Supreme Court held that 
scope of employment standard in a negligence case would' be 
*1 - This issue appears to be one of firbt impression in Utah. 
**2 - See Mast v. Rogers, 254 NE2d 179 (Illinois, 1969). Bagley 
v. Gilbert, 428 NYS2d 737 (New York, 1980). Eisnaugle 
v. Booth, 226 NE2d 259 (West Virginia, 1976) 
-5-
different than that in a tort case. Here, plaintiff was 
involved in a collision in her employer's parking lot. The 
accident occurred after working hours. The South Carolina 
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was not barred by 
South Carolinafs Workmen's Compensation Act from suing a co-
employee who caused the accident for negligence. 
Another South Carolina case is instructive. 
Williams v. gebbington, 146 SE2d 853 (South Carolina, 1966). 
Here, the plaintiff was struck by a car driven by a fellow 
employee. The accident occurred on company property, but 
prior to the start of work. The South Carolina Supreme 
Court held that a co-employee would only be immune from a 
negligence suit when it could be shown he was performing 
work for his employer. Since this was not occurring in this 
case, the plaintiff was allowed to sue the co-employee for 
negligence. 
In Molino y^ Asher, 588 P.2d 1033 (Nevada, 1979), 
the Nevada Supreme Court considered this same issue. Here, 
an employee parked her car in an employer's parking lot as 
she prepared to go to work. A co-employee struck her vehi-
cle causing injury. She sued the co-employee for negli-
gence. The Nevada Supreme Court held that the employee 
could maintain a negligence suit against the co-employee 
despite Nevada workmen's compensation law. A different 
standard for scope of employment in negligence suits was the 
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basis of the ruling. 
In Ward y^ Wright^ 490 SW2d 223 (Texas, 1973) the 
Texas Civil Appeals Court reached the same conclusion. 
Here, another employee was injured by a co-employee on the 
employer's parking lot. The Texas Court Allowed the injured 
employee to sue his co-employee for negligence despite the 
Texas Workmen's Compensation Statute. 
In Beajrd v^ Brown^ et a l ^ 616 P. 2d 726 (Wyoming, 
1980) this same issue was decided. Herp, an employee was 
traveling to work when he negligently caused an automobile 
accident. Suit was brought against his Employer, the R. L. 
Frailey Company. The trial court held th^t the employee was 
within the scope of his employment. Judgment was entered 
against the employer. The employer appealed. The Wyoming 
Supreme Court held that while the employee might have been 
within the scope of employment for purposes of workmen's 
compensation, he was not in the scope of employment for the 
purpose of negligence lawsuit. The Wyoming Supreme Court 
stated: 
By saying this, we do not intend to over-
rule or limit in any way the holdings of 
those cases. It is sufficient to point 
out that they are all worker's Compensa-
tion cases and, as such, their holdings 
are not generally applicable in the neg-
ligence area. [616 P.2d at 736] 
Finally, in MeIvor y^ Savage, 33 Cal. Rptr. 740 
(California, 1963), the California Court of Appeals reached 
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this same conclusion. Here, the plaintiff was injured by 
another co-employee in a parking lot owned by their 
employer. The injured employee sued the co-employee for 
negligently injuring him. The co-employee defended on the 
basis that the injured employee's sole and exclusive remedy 
for the injury was workmen's compensation. The trial court 
granted summary judgment for the co-employee. The injured 
employee appealed. On appeal, the California Court of 
Appeals reversed the trial court and ruled that the injured 
employee could sue for negligence. The court held that sim-
ply because the injured employee had collected workmen's 
compensation benefits was no reason to dismiss his negli-
gence lawsuit. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION DEFINITION OF 
"COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT" IN THIS CASE AND 
THEREFORE THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF 
THIS LAWSUIT MUST BE REVERSED. 
In the instant case, the failure of trial court to 
apply a different definition of "course of employment" in 
this case resulted in the dismissal of the Appellant's claim 
for damages. If the Court rules that it was erroneous to 
automatically apply "course of employment" as this term has 
evolved in the context of workmen's compensation cases to 
negligence cases then it must reverse the trial court's 
decision. 
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The court must be cognizant of public policy con-
siderations in deciding this case. A rilling which allows 
this decision of trial court to stand wijll preclude anyone 
in the state who is injured in their employer's parking lot 
(or otherwise on his premises) from bringing a lawsuit for 
negligence. The sole remedy of these individuals will be 
workmen's compensation. 
Workmen's compensation is an inadequate remedy for 
injured individuals because it fails to provide damages for 
either pain and suffering or loss of earning capacity. 
Individuals who are, forced to accept workmen's compensation 
are not fully compensated for their injuries. Additionally, 
since workmen's compensation is paid irrespective of fault, 
this remedy provides no incentive to negligent individuals 
to behave in careful manner and to a^oid accidents and 
injuries. 
Consequently, affirmation of £he trial court's 
decision and application of the workmen'? compensation rule 
to negligence cases defeats the twin aims of the Civil 
Justice System. These are: 
(1) Fully compensate injured plaintiffs for losses 
which are not their fault; 
(2) Deter negligent misconduct by forcing negli-
gent individuals to pay for the harm they have caused. 
CONCLUSION 
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Appellant asks that this court reverse and overturn 
the ruling and order by the Honoraole John Wahlquist dis-
missing appellant's lawsuit against the respondent. 
The fact of the matter is that "scope of 
employment" has received a very liberal definition in work-
men's compensation cases. To the extent that this liberal 
definition helps compensate injured employees it may be 
meritorious. However, to rigidly and automatically apply 
this same definition to a negligence case to keep an injured 
person from recovering damages is poor reasoning. 
The Appellant had not punched in for the day at the 
time of the accident. She was not engaged in work for her 
employer. She was not in a negligence case. 
Workmen's compensation law was devised to compen-
sate injured employees regardless of their fault in causing 
an injury. In return for compensation on a "no-fault" 
basis, the injured employee lost his right to claim damages 
for "pain and suffering" and other non-economic damages. 
The benefits that an injured employee is allowed to claim 
are severely limited to benefits provided under Utah lav; by 
the Utah Industrial Commission. Generally speaking, the 
employee receives payment of medical expenses and some com-
pensation for time he/she misses from work as a result of 
the injury. 
Utah Courts have traditionally construed our stat-
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ute in a way so as to provide the maximum amount of coverage 
for employees. In other words, when th^re is doubt about 
whether an employee is entitled to coverage, this doubt has 
generally been resolved in favor of the injured employee. 
The idea is that it is better for the ^ployer to pay an 
employee's medical bills than for the injured employee to be 
compensated by the taxpayers through public assistance, 
welfare, and/or rehabilitation. A length^ list of Utah case 
law supports this view. 
I n
 Z§£iS 2i§il Consolidated Mirfres v^ Industrial 
Commission, 36 P.2d 979 (Utah, 1934), th$ court agreed with 
this receiving a salary for the time she (spent in the park-
ing lot. The only thing that brought h^r arguably within 
the course of her employment was the fact) that the accident 
occurred on her employer's premises. Appellant should not 
lose her right to bring a suit for negligence simply because 
she was injured on her employer's premise$. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
O HaiA J rit4 
MARK H. GOULJ) 
Attorney for Appellant 
2661 Washington Boulevard 
Suite 202 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
(801) 621-36$2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this u T\ day of February, 
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1987, I mailed four true and correct copies of the above and 
foregoing Brief of Appellant, postage prepaid, to Wendell E. 
Bennett, Attorney for Respondent, 448 East 400 South, Suite 
304, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
MARK H. GOULD 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUfNTY, STATEEOf' UT^H 
DOROTHY LYNETTE HOPE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RUSSELL C. BERRETT, 
Defendant. 
The defense attorney is invited to submit Findings of 
Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment consistent with that 
indicated below. 
ASSUMED FACTS 
For the purposes of this motion], the following facts are 
assumed to be true. 
1. Both the plaintiff and th^ defendant were, at the 
time in question, employees of the Depaiftment of Defense, on the 
installation that is referred to as the Defense Depot in Ogden. 
This Depot is a secure military installation in the sense that 
there are armed guards at the gates ahd it requires an appro-
priate pass before a person may enter. Traffic is regulated on 
the Depot by the military. The militaty assigns parking spaces 
or parking areas to its employees. 
2. The plaintiff was on her way to work on the morning 
in question. She had entered the gatei She proceeded to her 
MEMORANDUM DECISION \ 
Case No. 92546 
- \3> -
Page 2 
Memorandum Decision 
Case No. 92546 
parking area, immediately east of the administration building. 
She got out of her car and was a pedestrian in the parking area 
on the way to her punch in station. 
3. The defendant is also an employee of the Depot. He 
was also on his route to his work station. He had entered the 
Depot. He had entered the parking area. He was driving his 
pickup in search of a vacant parking stall. 
4. The plaintiff was struck by the defendant's pickup 
truck. For the purpose of this ruling, the Court will assume 
that the defendant driver of the pickup truck negligently struck 
the pedestrian, even though the Court recognizes that this 
allegation is denied, and the defendant does in fact insist the 
fault is primarily that of the pedestrian. 
5. Neither of the parties have yet reached their time 
clock punch in station. Both parties were in the parking lot 
provided for their use. 
6. The plaintiff has filed for her workman1s compensa-
tion benefits. She has collected them. The federal decisions 
indicates clearly that a person is regarded to be at work when 
the employee crosses the boundary line of the employer's 
premises. The various cases discussed this view and hold that 
their needs to be a fixed line where workman's compensation does 
afix. This could argumentatively be after the check punch, or 
after entry to the building where they are employed, or after 
Page 3 
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they reached their assigned parking stalls, or when they enter 
onto the premises. The federal rule is clear that a federal 
employee is at work when the federal employee goes through the 
gate. The plaintiff has collected all olf her workman1 s compensa-
tion/ and regardless of whether the parking stall was negligently 
designed, etc., or not, the employer is protected from suit. 
7. There can be no question but that the defendant had 
also entered onto his employer's premises. He was in an area 
basically controlled by his employer. The issue is whether or 
not he is protected from a negligent sutlt on the theory that he 
is a federal employee under workman's compensation. 
RULING 
This Court believes that the federal authority is the 
protection to the employer occurred at |the property line. Utah 
also has the "property line" rule for (employers. This is the 
majority state rule. There is little logical support for a 
different rule for the fellow servants that are forced to the 
location. Workman's compensation insurance was also for the 
fellow servant's benefit as well as the employer's. 
JUDGMENT 
The motion for summary judgment lis granted. 
DATED this 30 day of October, p.986. 
WENDELL E. BENNETT 
Bar License 00287 
Attorney at Law 
Attorney for Defendant 
448 East 400 South, Suite 304 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
801-532-7846 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
---oooOooo 
DOROTHY LYNETTE HOPE, : FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
Plaintiff, : JUDGMENT 
vs • : 
RUSSELL C. BERRETT, : Civil No- 92546 
Defendant. : 
oooOooo 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, District Judge on Friday, 
October 10, 1986. Mark H. Gould appeared on behalf and represented 
the interests of the plaintiff Dorothy Lynette Hope. Wendell E. 
Bennett appeared on behalf of-and represented the interests of the 
defendant Russell C. Berrett. Both prior to the hearing and 
subsequent thereto, both parties submitted memoranda to the Court 
citing authorities relied on by them. The Court having read and 
considered the pre-argument and post-argument memoranda, and having 
heard argument by counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, 
now makes and enters its findings of fact, conclusions of lav, and 
judgment as follows, to wit: 
REc &VE n 
ri
'
J
* 1 :, 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On October 17, 1984, at approximately 7:15 a.m., the 
motor vehicle accident out of which this lawsuit arises occurred. 
At said time, both the plaintiff and the defendant were employees 
of the United States Government on the military installation that 
is commonly known as the Defense Depot in Ogd^n. The Depot is* a 
secure military installation in the sense thatt there are armed 
guards at the gates and it requires an appropriate pass before a 
person may enter the installation. Traffic i$ regulated on the 
Depot by the military. The military assigns parking spaces or 
parking areas to its employees. 
2. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was on her 
way to work at her assigned work area within the military install-
ation. She had entered the gate, proceeded t$ her parking area, 
exited her car, and was walking toward the Administration Building 
where she would punch a time clock and commence her work activ-
ities. 
3. The defendant, also an employee at the Defense Depot in 
Ogden, had also entered the premises of the Defense Depot in Ogden 
through a manned security gate, and was driving his motor vehicle 
within the parking lot where he was assigned to park on his way to 
his assigned parking stall preparatory to leaving his vehicle, 
punching in for work, and commencing his work,. 
4. As both the plaintiff and the defendant were within the 
Defense Depot in Ogden secured area, and were in particular in the 
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parking area adjacent to their work station, with the plaintiff 
then being a pedestrian, and the defendant then being a driver, a 
motor vehicle pedestrian accident occurred between the plaintiff 
and the defendant's motor vehicle being operated by the defendant. 
The plaintiff claims the defendant was negligent in causing the 
motor vehicle pedestrian accident, and the defendant denies that 
negligence, and has alleged the plaintiff was negligent in causing 
the accident. For the purposes of the motion for summary judgment, 
the question of liability is not material, and is not the basis 
for the summary judgment. 
5. Even though neither of the parties had reached their 
assigned work station, where they would punch in on a time clock, 
or commence their work duties, they were both on the premises of 
their common employer, both having entered the secure military 
premises through security gates, and were in the near vicinity of 
their work station. The parking lot area is an area assigned by 
their employer for their use in parking motor vehicles by which 
they arrive at their place of employment. 
6. The plaint iff.has filed for Workman's Compensation 
benefits under the Federal Employee's Compensation Act, and has 
received those benefits from the Employment Standards Administra-
tion, Office of Workman's Compensation Programs, the employer's 
Workman's Compensation carrier. 
From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court makes and 
enters the following, 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Under both the State Law of the Stat|e of Utah, and the 
applicable law under the Federal Employee's Compensation Act and 
the Federal Driver!s Act, and the cases decided! by both the State 
Court and the various Federal Courts hold, and |this Court accord-
ingly holds that the Workman's Compensation benefits applied for 
by the plaintiff and paid by the employer of the plaintiff and the 
defendant is the exclusive remedy in this case,| the accident having 
occurred on the employer's premises, even though the employee had 
not yet arrived at her work station. Workman'5 Compensation .being 
the exclusive remedy to the plaintiff both as 4gainst her employer, 
the United States of America, and her fellow employee, the 
defendant Russell C. Berrett, judgment should tye granted to the 
defendant Russell C. Berrett on his motion for summary judgment. 
JUDGMENT 
The Court having made and entered the foregoing findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, now 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES that defendant's motion for 
summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff*s complaint with preju-
dice is hereby granted. 
DATED this / <^day of November, 19 8 61. 
BY THE COURT: 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
on the "9' ,J-f day of /'' ~^~ L //,' \ , 1986 to Mark H. Gould, 2661 
Washington Blvd, Ogden, Utah 84401. '• , 
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